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Abstract:The effect of military expenditure on growth is a longstanding debate in defence economics 
and peace literatures.  The paper investigated the combined impact of military expenditure and 
Institutional quality on South Africa Inclusive growth. The authors add to the defence literature by 
constructing an inclusive growth index for South Africa, so as to capture the joint real effect of 
military expenditure and institutional quality. Only corruption was selected as a reliable proxy for 
institutional quality, since corruption is often a symptom of bad institution. Using data from 1984 to 
2017, the result suggests that the impact of military expenditure on South Africa inclusive growth is 
positive and significant whereas military expenditure impact in the presence of corruption retards 
South Africa inclusive growth.  
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Introduction 
The question of how military expenditure affects economic growth is a 
longstanding one in the literature, dating back to empirical studies by(Benoit, 1973, 
Benoit, 1978) which argued that military expenditure has a positive impact on 
economic growth. Although, this subject matter has secured a growing attention in 
wide–ranging empirical studies which made use of various methodologies and 
theoretical frameworks, a consensus has not been reached (Dunne, 2005, 
Alexander, 2015). 
A positive link of military expenditure and economic growth are found in 
developed and emerging countries, which may be because military expenditure 
provides the enabling environment (Security) for local and international 
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investment. Furthermore, it contributes to growth via utilization of resources, 
particularly in employment generation, Research and Development, provision of 
vocational training (Menla Ali and Dimitraki, 2014, Meng , 2015, Zhao, 2015). 
Recent empirical findings suggested that military expenditure have an adverse, 
positive or insignificant impact on growth depending on the number of countries 
considered, time span or empirical method employed in the study. 
Conversely, adverse link between military expenditure and economic growth 
happens as a result it crowd-outs public investment, from productive activities to 
unproductive ones(Ward and Davis, 1992, Mintz and Stevenson, 1995, Klein, 
2004, Kentor and Kick, 2008, Shahbaz and Shabbir, 2012). The economic impact 
of military expenditure is mixed and inconclusive with results depending on the 
country or sample of countries, the time period or methodology used (Smith, 2000, 
Dunne, 2005, d’Agostino, 2017). 
The below  commences the clarion call for an empirical investigation on why 
military expenditure is positive in some countries and negative in other countries, 
or what environment influence changes in military expenditure-growth impact.  
A potential explanation for the diversity of these conclusions could be the 
institutional environment that the military expenditure is taking place. For example, 
a common concerned is whether military expenditure exert positive to growth 
during high threat periods or whether high military expenditure is influence by rent 
seeking or corruption. (Aizenman and Glick, 2006) postulate that an economy with 
high military expenditure in an environment with widespread corruption and rent 
seeking tend to lead to adverse impact of military expenditure on growth and vice 
versa. 
(d’Agostino et al., 2012) further examined military expenditure-growth in the 
presence of corruption using African sample from 2003 to 2007.They found that 
corruption does influence the impact of military expenditure on growth. In  related 
paper, (d’Agostino et al., 2017) re-examined the military expenditure –growth 
using 1996-2007 period by employing a System GMM estimation confirms that 
military expenditure and corruption does retard economic growth. 
Recently (Compton and Paterson, 2016) consider how institutions can impact 
military expenditure-growth nexus. Based on 100 countries of annual data from 
1988 to 2010 by employing Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and system 
generalized methods of moments (GMM), the authors find that military 
expenditure on growth is negative or zero at best and this impact is lessened in the 
presence of good economic and political institutions. 
Consequently, with diverse of ideas and empirical findings on the relationship 
between military expenditure and growth, it is imperative that a study on South 
Africa will not only contribute to the debate but also set a benchmark for other 
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studies that will follow this research work. This is because there has been no 
previous studies on South Africa to the best of the authors’ knowledge. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows Section 1.2 present literature review on 
military expenditure, institutional quality and economic growth. Section 1.3 
provides the empirical review of literature on military expenditure and economic 
growth. Section 1.4 and 1.5. present the model and data and result presented 
respectively. Section 1.6 presents the conclusion. 
Literature Review on Military Expenditure, Institution and Growth 
(Aizenman and Glick, 2006, Compton and Paterson, 2016) affirms that high 
military expenditure in the presence of high threat environment leads to economic 
growth via the provision of security while high military expenditure in the presence 
of low threats will retard economic growth via wide spread corruption and rent 
seeking (d’Agostino et al., 2012) further examined military expenditure-growth in 
the presence of corruption using African sample from 2003 to 2007.They found 
that corruption does influence the impact of military expenditure on growth. In  
related paper, (d’Agostino et al., 2017) re-examined the military expenditure –
growth using 1996-2007 period by employing a System GMM estimation confirms 
that military expenditure and corruption does retard economic growth. 
Recently (Compton and Paterson, 2016) consider how institutions can impact 
military expenditure-growth nexus. Based on 100 countries of annual data from 
1988 to 2010 by employing Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and system-
generalized methods of moments (GMM). The authors find that military 
expenditure on growth is negative or zero at best and this impact is lessened in the 
presence of good economic and political institutions. 
 
Data and Empirical Approach  
Data 
Considering the connection between military expenditure and institutions on 
inclusive growth in BRICS countries, (1984-2017). Inclusive growth index data 
that covers from 1984 to 2017 were presented in the appendix. Military 
expenditure data were obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute extended database 1948 to 2017, which is relatively the standard in the 
literature.  
Another variable of concern is institutional quality variables.  Here, the proxy for 
institutional quality is corruption. The institutional quality proxy variable is source 
from IRIS/International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Each of the ICRG 
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measures range of 0 to 6, with higher values representing less corruption. In other 
words, higher scores indicate better institutions. 
Other variables were obtained from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). 
 
Study Period  
The study period is 1984 to 2017. Data source for military expenditure at share of 
GDP were obtained from SIPRI database because it has more complete data series.  
Description of Variables and data source 
Variables  Definition Sources 
Key variables 
I.G Inclusive growth Index  Author computatio  
ME Military expenditure 
(Share of GDP) 
World Bank and Stockholm 
International Peace Research 
Institute new extended database 
1984-2017 
External Threat External threats are classified 
as wars involving two 
independent countries  
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database 1984 -2017 
 
 
 
 
Internal threat Internal threats include Civil 
war, insurgency crisis and 
communal clashes 
Institutional 
quality 
Corruption as proxy for 
institutional quality 
POP BRICS Population growth rate  
 
World Bank Development Database 
2018 (WDI) 
 
Security Web BRICS Security Web 
measured by averaging of the 
ratio of military expenditure to 
GDP of BRICS neighboring 
countries 
INV. Investment 
EDU BRICS Education 
 
The authors employed Z-sum score technique in this study. In this approach, equation for the 
normalized value according to KOTHARI, C. R. 2004. Research methodology: Methods and 
techniques, New Age International, ULLAH, S. & KIANI, A. K. 2017. Maqasid-al-Shariah-based 
socio-economic development index (SCECDI): The case of some selected Islamic economies. 
Journal of Emerging Economies & Islamic Research, 5..After finding the Z-sum score, the authors  
evaluate the average of the area under the curves already normalized. These values are considered as 
inclusive growth index by the following: Inclusive Growth Index (I.G.I.) = Average of Z score is 
divided by number of observation that is I.G.I.= 50% of Social Growth indicators + 50% of Economic 
Growth Indicators (IGI=
∑ 𝑥
𝑛
 )  0<IGI<1. 
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The values of the IGI index vary between 0 and 1; if values close to 0 indicates that BRICS countries 
has very low level of inclusive Economic growth. On the other hand, values close to 1 indicates that 
the BRICS countries has a very high level of inclusive Economic growth.  
 
Empirical Approach 
For the empirical analysis, times series panel approach was adopted. The panel 
growth equation for this research adopt (Aizenman and Glick, 2006) and  
(Compton and Paterson, 2016) empirical approaches written  as  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛽3 𝑀 . 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Y- is the inclusive growth index, 𝑀 .  (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡- is the interaction of 
military expenditure with institution, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  – is the set of control variables – 
education, population and Investment variables. 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term.  
Data Estimation and Interpretation  
The study begins the analysis of the impact of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on inclusive growth in BRICS countries with descriptive analysis. Results 
of the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6. Summary of the descriptive 
results shows that all the series show a high level of consistency as their means and 
medians fall within the maximum and minimum values of these series. Results of 
standard deviation, which measures the level of  variation or degree of dispersion 
of the variables from their means, reveal that the actual deviation of the data  from 
their means are very small as all the standard deviations are very low.  Also, the 
most volatile is the variable of interaction between military expenditure and 
corruption (4.15%) while the least volatile is the GDP (0.18%) follow by 
population growth (0.41%). 
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 Growt
h 
Military Corrupt. Mil*Co
rr. 
Educatio
n 
Pop. Invest. 
Mean 0.56054
8 
1.67553
1 1.888973 
3.96160
8 1.997633 8.234231 1.350123 
Median 0.53000
0 
1.51250
3 2.000000 
3.34405
2 1.627790 8.160083 0.777008 
Maximum 0.92000
0 
5.50375
6 5.330000 
20.7805
4 6.371640 9.097859 6.186882 
Minimum 0.00000
0 
0.00000
0 0.000000 
0.00000
0 0.000000 7.546916 
-
0.178437 
Std. Dev. 0.18234
8 
1.39011
3 1.618897 
4.15111
9 2.268775 0.412856 1.581964 
Observatio
n 
146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the exogenous variables used to achieve 
the second objectives. Correlation matrix shows the degree of association and 
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direction of relationship among the variables. Results in Table 2 show that the 
degree of association that exists among the independent variables. It can be 
deduced that that all independent variables can be included in the same model 
without the fear of multicollinearity. Furthermore, result shows that while all other 
independent variables and the interactive variable have negative relationship with 
inclusive growth, population growth is the only variable that has positive 
relationship with inclusive growth. 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 Corruption Education Growth Investment Military Mil*cor Pop 
Corruption 1.000000       
Education 0.442204 1.000000      
Growth -0.409220 -0.389133 1.000000     
Investment 0.310443 0.311967 -0.186814 1.000000 
   
Military 0.356456 0.006495 -0.539541 0.237188 1.000000   
Mil*cor 0.774648 0.203598 -0.497215 0.166961 0.700897 1.000000  
POP -0.194754 -0.279060 0.283095 0.132430 -0.260201 -0.243763 1.000000 
The next step is to examine whether long-run relationship exists among the 
variables. The accepted method to test the unit root for stationarity of variables and 
settle the degree of integration of a time series is to apply the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test. Therefore, these tests for unit root process at the level and at the 
first differences of all variables have been performed and reported in Table 3. 
According to Table 3, ADF  unit root test reveals that Military expenditure, 
Corruption (as proxy for institutions quality) and Inclusive growth (IG), all the 
time series are I(1) and I(0).  
Table 3. UNIT ROOTS TEST RESULT 
South Africa  ADF  
Statistics 
Order of 
Integration 
IG -9.214333 I(1) 
ME -4.966555 I(1) 
Corr. -4.156739 I(1) 
M*Corr. -4.006266 I(1) 
Edu -5.050282 I(1) 
INV -4.320993 I(0) 
POP -1.611576 I(1) 
Note: The unit root test for South Africa was conducted using EVIEWS 15.0. 
All the tests have been carried out starting from the most general (with drift and 
trend) to the most restricted model (without drift and trend) as also suggested by 
Enders (1995). Then, the above conclusions have been reached.  
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Having found out that the time series are I(1), cointegration analysis can be 
considered to identify the long-run relationship between Military expenditure (Me), 
Institutions (Is) and Inclusive growth (IG).  
To Perform The Standard Ardl Bound Test, All Economic Variables In The Model 
Must Have The Same Order Of Integration.  
Ardl Bound Testing  
The ardl bound testing provides the log likelihood ratio statistics for determining 
the number (r) of long run relationship between ig, me, corr., edu. Pop and m*corr. 
If calculated value of the statistics (Johansen trace test statistic) is greater than 95% 
critical value, the null of r= 0, which indicates no long-run relationship, is rejected 
against the alternative hypothesis.   
Now that we have established that, IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr. are non-
stationary at level and integrated to the same order I (1), we can test for the 
presence of integration. 
ARDL Bounds Test 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic  7.048656 6 
   
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 2.12 3.23 
5% 2.45 3.61 
2.5% 2.75 3.99 
1% 3.15 4.43 
The ARDL bound test results are reported above. Results indicate that there is a 
relationship between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth in South Africa since the calculated value of the statistics is greater than 5% 
critical value. The ARDL bound test results for South Africa (7.048 is greater than 
2.45 at 5%), and statistically significant at α= 1% and 5% respectively. This shows 
that there is a long-run relationship among the among military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth. 
Ardl Cointegrating And Long Run 
Cointegrating Form 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
D(GROWTH(-1)) 0.592783 0.382688 1.548999 0.1497 
D(COR) 0.235052 0.081168 2.895879 0.0146 
D(COR(-1)) -0.292282 0.128109 -2.281505 0.0434 
D(EDU) 0.026773 0.011595 2.309041 0.0414 
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Interpretation of ARDL Cointegrating and Long Run  
Considering the individual variable in the context of South Africa, the long run 
relationship and impact of corruption, the result is an indication that corruption 
exhibits a positive long run relationship with inclusive growth which is a proxy for 
institutional quality. The long run coefficient of corruption is 0.205664 and it is 
statistically at 5% level. The implication of this is that there is presence positive 
additive of corruption (i.e. greasing the wheels for growth) reduces government red 
tape1 bureaucracies, therefore promoting inclusive growth. Therefore, according to 
the result, a unit in corruption will retards inclusive growth by 20 %. 
Another variable employed in the model Education. The long run relationship and 
impact of education shown, the result is an indication that education exhibits a 
positive long run relationship with inclusive growth which is a proxy for human 
development. The long run coefficient of education is 0.021915 and it is 
                                                          
1 Red tape is an idiom that refers to excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that is 
considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. It is usually 
applied to governments, corporations, and other large organizations. 
D(EDU(-1)) -0.010868 0.010092 -1.076838 0.3046 
D(INV) 0.011503 0.013460 0.854589 0.4110 
D(INV(-1)) 0.030617 0.010002 3.060922 0.0108 
D(MCP) -0.026138 0.035795 -0.730217 0.4805 
D(MCP(-1)) 0.088567 0.043436 2.039025 0.0662 
D(ME) -0.032302 0.138514 -0.233203 0.8199 
D(ME(-1)) -0.351244 0.203179 -1.728738 0.1118 
D(POP) -3.081832 0.905659 -3.402863 0.0059 
D(POP(-1)) 2.509094 0.895300 2.802519 0.0172 
CointEq(-1) -2.479577 0.636630 -3.894848 0.0025 
    Cointeq = GROWTH - (0.2057*COR + 0.0219*EDU  -0.0039*INV  -0.0427 
        *MCP + 0.2143*ME  -0.5048*POP + 0.2939 ) 
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
COR 0.205664 0.027275 7.540482 0.0000 
EDU 0.021915 0.009918 2.209576 0.0493 
INV -0.003913 0.011707 -0.334240 0.7445 
MCP -0.042703 0.010504 -4.065449 0.0019 
ME 0.214268 0.057919 3.699453 0.0035 
POP -0.504764 0.075661 -6.671357 0.0000 
C 0.293911 0.061740 4.760442 0.0006 
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statistically at 5% level. The implication of this is that South Africa education 
system that stimulate inclusive growth. Therefore, according to the result, a unit in 
education will retard inclusive growth by 2.1 %. 
Investment long run coefficient is -0.003913. The result is an indication that 
investment exhibits an adverse long run relationship with inclusive growth and it 
statistically significant at 5%. The implication of this is that there is need more 
investment in more inclusive sectors to stimulate inclusive growth.  
Another variable employed the military corruption interactive. The long run 
relationship and impact of education, the result is an indication that military-
corruption interactive exhibits an adverse long run relationship with inclusive 
growth. The long run coefficient of military corruption interactive is -0.042703. 
The implication of this is that military-corruption interactive retards inclusive 
growth. Therefore, according to the result, a unit in military expenditure-corruption 
interactive will retard inclusive growth by 4.2 %. 
Military expenditure indicates a significant positive long run relationship on 
inclusive growth, the result is an indication that military expenditure exhibits a 
positive long run relationship with inclusive growth. The long run coefficient of 
military expenditure is 0.214268. The implication of this is that there is military 
expenditure stimulate inclusive growth. Therefore, according to the result, a unit in 
military expenditure will stimulate inclusive growth by 21 %. 
Population long run coefficient is -0.504764. The result is an indication that 
population exhibits a negative long run relationship with inclusive growth and it is 
statistically significant at 5%. The implication of this is that South Africa 
population growth rate undermines the actualization of inclusive growth.  
Under the short run aspect of the cointegration regression, the result show that all 
the variables used as a determinant for inclusive growth in South Africa during the 
under review. The result show that the lagged values of corruption, education, 
investment, military expenditure, military corruption all have short run significant 
impact on military expenditure  in South Africa. 
 
Diagnostic Tests (Post Estimation)  
The below present the post estimation diagnostic tests ranging from 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. The rationale of the post estimation tests 
is to ascertain the how robustness the previous estimations results. 
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Test For Heteroskedaticity For South Africa 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.546328 Prob. F(15,16) 0.8755 
Obs*R-squared 10.83854 Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.7640 
Scaled explained SS 1.903403 Prob. Chi-Square(15) 1.0000 
 
The result of the heteroskedasticity test is presented above for South Africa. The 
null hypothesis is that there is heteroskedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is 
discovered that the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be 
accepted. Therefore, it was concluded that the model is not having the problem of 
heteroskedasticity which may affect the validity of the result. 
Test For Serial Correlation For South Africa 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 2.497440 Prob. F(2,14) 0.1182 
Obs*R-squared 8.414697 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0149 
The null hypothesis for South Africa indicates that there is no serial correlation. 
Since the F-statistic and the probability, it is obvious that the null hypothesis is to 
accepted while we rejected the alternative hypothesis that there is serial correlation. 
Consequently, the estimates from our model are valid and can be used for 
forecasting. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The paper investigate the combined effect of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on South Africa inclusive growth. The research employed Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) estimation technique with data spanning over more than 
30 years.  
We add to this literature by constructing an inclusive growth index for South 
Africa so as to capture the joint real effect of military expenditure and institutional 
quality. We used only corruption as a reliable proxy for institutional quality, since 
corruption is often a symptom of bad institution.  
In conclusion, our result suggests that the impact of military expenditure on South 
Africa inclusive growth is positive and significant whereas military expenditure 
impact in the presence of corruption retards South Africa inclusive growth. The 
followings are recommendations that can be explored by South Africa 
policymakers: 
1. There is need for the government to strengthen constitutional 
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anticorruption institutions and civil societies to ensure that corrupt 
tendencies within military sector are reduced to the barest minimum. 
2. Aggressive public education to change the mind set of South Africa 
citizens to make them see corruption as evil and a common enemy. 
3. Establishment of special courts to deal with corruption cases separately and 
strengthen the weak legal system. 
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Appendix 
South Africa Inclusive Growth Index from 1984 to 2017 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
1970 0.58 1982 0.43 1994 0.33 2006 0.52 
1971 0.46 1983 0.32 1995 0.41 2007 0.39 
1972 0.52 1984 0.26 1996 0.45 2008 0.53 
1973 0.51 1985 0.23 1997 0.35 2009 0.38 
1974 0.52 1986 0.24 1998 0.32 2010 0.38 
1975 0.53 1987 0.28 1999 0.4 2011 0.52 
1976 0.45 1988 0.36 2000 0.53 2012 0.4 
1977 0.43 1989 0.19 2001 0.39 2013 0.39 
1978 0.38 1990 0.35 2002 0.37 2014 0.41 
1979 0.38 1991 0.27 2003 0.3 2015 0.26 
1980 0.43 1992 0.24 2004 0.43 2016 0.24 
1981 0.39 1993 0.39 2005 0.38 2017 0.09 
Source: Author Computation 
  
